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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to examine whether earnings management among underinvestment firms is positively related to 
share price. Firms are said to have high growth opportunity but is unable to fund investment projects due to liquidity 
constraints because of the information asymmetry between the firm and the investors. As a result, firms have to provide 
high quality accounting information (i.e. value relevant information) to reduce information asymmetry and hence 
be free from liquidity constraints. One type of accounting information that can be provided is discretionary accrual 
(proxy for earnings management). The sample of this study is firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia from 
year 2001 to 2007. We use Ohlson’s model to examine the value relevance of earnings management. We separate 
earnings into managed and unmanaged earnings. Panel data regression analyses were performed to examine the 
role of underinvestment on the relationship between earnings management and share price. We also examine the 
value relevance of earnings management using the return model. The results from the panel data regression analysis 
indicate that earnings management increases the value relevance of accounting information. Further, underinvestment 
moderates the relationship between earnings management and share price. Nevertheless, the results suggest that 
earnings management among firms can decrease the value relevance of accounting information. In general, it is 
concluded that underinvestment weakens the relationship between earnings management and share price/return, hence 
it motivates managers to convey opportunistic earnings management.
Keywords: Informational earnings management; value relevance; information asymmetry; underinvestment
ABSTRAK
Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk menguji sama ada pengurusan perolehan terutamanya bagi firma terkurang pelaburan 
mempunyai hubungan yang positif dengan nilai saham. Firma yang terkurang pelaburan dikatakan mempunyai 
peluang pertumbuhan yang tinggi namun tidak dapat membiayai projek pelaburan disebabkan kekangan kecairan yang 
disebabkan oleh jurang maklumat antara firma dan para pelabur. Ini menyebabkan firma yang terkurang pelaburan 
perlu menyediakan maklumat perakaunan yang berkualiti tinggi (i.e. maklumat yang mempunyai kerelevanan nilai) bagi 
mengurangkan jurang maklumat dan seterusnya bebas dari kekangan kecairan. Satu cara yang boleh dilakukan oleh 
firma adalah menerusi pengurusan perolehan yang bermaklumat. Ini berbeza dengan kajian lepas yang menunjukkan 
pengurus biasanya melakukan pengurusan maklumat secara oportunis. Sampel bagi kajian ini terdiri daripada firma 
yang tersenarai di Papan Utama  Bursa Malaysia dari tahun 2001 hingga 2007. Kami menggunakan Model Ohlson 
bagi menentukan kerelevanan nilai pengurusan perolehan. Kami telah mengasingkan perolehan kepada perolehan 
tidak boleh diurus dan perolehan boleh urus (pengurusan perolehan). Analisis regresi data panel telah digunakan untuk 
menguji peranan terkurang pelaburan ke atas hubungan antara pengurusan perolehan dan harga saham. Kami juga 
menggunakan model pulangan untuk menguji kerelevanan nilai pengurusan perolehan. Dapatan dari analisis regresi 
data panel menunjukkan pengurusan perolehan meningkatkan kerelevanan nilai maklumat perakaunan. Selanjutnya 
terkurang pelaburan memoderatkan hubungan antara pengurusan perolehan dan harga saham. Walau bagaimanapun 
dapatan juga mencadangkan pengurusan perolehan di kalangan firma terkurang pelaburan mengurangkan kerelevanan 
angka perakaunan. Secara umumnya, dapat disimpulkan bahawa terkurang pelaburan melemahkan hubungan antara 
pengurusan perolehan dan harga saham dan pulangan, seterusnya memotivasi pengurus untuk menyampaikan 
pengurusan perolehan secara oportunistik.   
Kata kunci: Pengurusan perolehan bermaklumat; kerelevanan nilai; jurang maklumat; terkurang pelaburan
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et al. (2013) which indicated that Malaysian firms might 
experience underinvestment. Underinvestment might 
motivate these firms to convey informational earnings 
management in order to gain financial support from 
external sources (Diamond & Verrecchia 1991; Kim 
& Verrecchia 1994). Nevertheless, underinvestment 
may also be related to opportunistic behaviour. Further, 
Malaysian data is unique as the legal system and capital 
market is well developed (Mohamad, Hassan & Ariff 
2007) and good quality accounting standards are in 
place (Wan Ismail, Kamarudin, van Zijl & Dustan 2013); 
however, the information environment is not rich (Ball, 
Robin & Wu 2003). This is contradictory to the developed 
countries whereby information asymmetry between 
the management and investors is minimized. Hence, 
signalling information through earnings management by 
firms in these countries may not have much impact on 
investors’ decisions as they can acquire other information 
provided in the annual report or any other formal or 
informal information channels in the market (Rahman 
et al. 2013). Therefore, the effect of underinvestment on 
the relationship between earnings management and share 
price may not be clearly seen. 
In a situation where the information environment 
is not rich, signalling through earnings management 
becomes important. In addition, Bhattacharya, Daouk & 
Welker (2003) also found that earnings aggressiveness 
is high in Malaysia, which could be affected by the 
opportunistic earnings management or informational 
earnings management. Based on the above arguments and 
findings by Rahman et al. (2013), we believed that the 
latter incentive would be dominant in an underinvestment 
setting. Our study will provide evidence from a new 
perspective concerning the effect of underinvestment on 
the relationship between earnings management and share 
price within this unique setting. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
Signalling theory and agency theory are normally used to 
explain the relationship between earnings management and 
the value relevance of accounting information. According 
to signalling theory, earnings management can be used to 
signal firm performance (Morris 1987). This implies that 
earnings management can be used to communicate private 
information that will enhance the information content of 
the accounting information (Jiraporn et al. 2008; Siregar 
& Utama 2008; Arya et al. 2003). 
Within the framework of agency theory, prior studies 
found that managers are likely to manage earnings in an 
opportunistic way. This behaviour will cause stakeholders 
to question the value relevance of accounting information 
(Dechow & Skinner 2000) since the financial statements 
do not reflect the true and fair view information. Therefore, 
this information cannot be relied upon in assessing firm 
performance and value; as earnings management has been 
INTRODUCTION
Although earnings management has always been 
associated with financial manipulation, managers are 
allowed by the generally accepted accounting principles 
to use their discretion in selecting accounting methods to 
communicate private information to the public (Jiraporn, 
Miller, Yoon & Kim 2008). As such, earnings management 
is informative and not always harmful to users (Fields, Lys 
& Vincent 2001; Jiraporn et al. 2008). However, research 
has been focusing on the opportunistic perspective 
of earnings management (for example, Mohd Saleh, 
Mohd Iskandar & Rahmat 2005, 2007; Abdul Rahman 
& Mohamed Ali 2006; Johl, Jubb & Houghton 2007; 
McNichols & Stubben 2008; Shan 2015). Limited studies 
(Gul, Leung & Srinidhi 2003; Krishnan 2003; Jiraporn 
et al. 2008; Siregar & Utama 2008; Rahman, Hassan, 
Mohd-Saleh & Abdul Shukor 2013) have investigated 
earnings management from the informational perspective. 
We believed that investors may value managed earnings 
as value-relevant information since it has been found by 
Rahman et al. (2013) that earnings management could 
also be informative.
Prior studies provided inconsistent results concerning 
the relationship between earnings management and the 
value relevance of accounting information. Dechow and 
Skinner (2000), Whelan and McNamara (2004), and Habib 
(2004) reported that earnings management lowers the value 
relevance of accounting information. These results are 
obtained because earnings management has been used in 
an opportunistic way. However, Subramanyam (1996) and 
Arya, Glover and Sunder (2003) provided a contradictory 
result and concluded that earnings management is 
informational. These findings support Fields et al. (2001) 
who indicated that earnings management is motivated 
by certain conditions. Underinvestment might be the 
one as Rahman et al. (2013) provided evidence that the 
negative relationship between earnings management 
and information asymmetry becomes stronger in 
underinvestment firms. However, studies that examine 
earnings management in underinvestment and non-
underinvestment firms are limited, which provides an 
avenue for research. While Kanagaretnam and Sarkar 
(2011) suggested revising managerial compensation 
packages to mitigate underinvestment problem; the current 
study provides an alternative view from the financial 
reporting perspective for underinvestment firms to finance 
their profitable projects. The new perspective is expected 
to shed some light on the issue of earnings management 
and the value relevance of accounting information within 
the scope of underinvestment firms. We believed that if 
underinvestment is one of the conditions for informational 
earnings management, it will strengthen the relationship 
between earnings management and share price. Otherwise, 
if underinvestment relates to opportunistic behaviour, value 
relevance of earnings management may be reduced. 
This study is motivated by the studies of Abdul 
Rahim, Yaacob, Alias and Mat Nor (2010) and Rahman 
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proven to lower value relevance of accounting information 
(Whelan & McNamara 2004; Habib 2004).
According to Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001), 
the accounting information is relevant if it relates to and 
can predict the market value of the firm. Consistent with 
Barth et al. (2001), Francis and Schipper (1999) also 
explained that the relevance of accounting information is 
if the information could affect stock prices or returns. If 
the accounting information can explain the variations in 
share prices, it means that accounting information is useful 
in decision-making. Thus, if the statistical relationship 
between accounting information and the stock prices 
is significant, then the information is said to be value 
relevant.
Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) and Francis 
and Schipper (1999) provided evidence that accounting 
earnings have information content that affects stock 
returns. However, these studies indicate that the value 
relevance of accounting information has decreased over 
time. The decline is due to increase in total revenue 
(transitory earnings/one-time items), increase in frequency 
of negative earnings, evolvement of average firm size and 
increase in the intensity of intangible assets (Collins 
et al. 1997). Balachandran and Mohanram (2011) 
extended the above studies and provided evidence that 
the decline in value relevance of accounting information 
is observed in steady conservatism firms, instead of in 
increasing conservatism firms. They concluded that 
the increasing conservatism might mitigate decline in 
value relevance. Meanwhile, Lev (1989) argued that the 
decline in the value relevance of accounting information 
is due to the low quality of accounting information. 
Earnings management is one of the indicators (Chan, 
Chan, Jegadeesh & Lakonishok 2006), which may 
reduce or improve the quality of information if it is used 
opportunistically or informatively. 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND VALUE RELEVANCE 
OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
The effect of earnings management on the value relevance 
of accounting information has received much attention in 
previous studies. The first group investigates the direct 
effect of earnings management on the value relevance of 
accounting information (Arya et al. 2003; Habib 2004; 
Whelan & McNamara 2004; Shan 2015). Meanwhile, the 
second group investigates the conditions that motivate 
the relationship between earnings management and the 
value relevance of earnings and book value (Gul, Leung & 
Srinidhi 2000; Defond & Park 2001; Marquardt & Wiedman 
2004; Bugshan 2005; Rahman & Mohd-Saleh 2008). 
Subramanyam (1996) investigated the role of 
discretionary accruals (a proxy for earnings management) 
to explain stock return variations. The study concluded 
that earnings management can improve the value 
relevance of accounting information. Arya et al. (2003) 
supported the view as managers may use their discretion 
in preparing the financial report to influence investors 
in their decision-making. The above studies were 
extended to Indonesia by Siregar and Utama (2008). 
They reported that earnings management is informative 
since it can be used to predict future profitability. This 
is consistent with Subramanyam (1996) who found 
that earnings management is considered by the equity 
market. Based on the above studies we believe earnings 
management can increase the value relevance of 
accounting information. 
However, prior studies also reported that earnings 
management impairs the value relevance of accounting 
information. Whelan and McNamara (2004) and Habib 
(2004) indicated that earnings management reduces the 
value relevance of earnings. A most recent study by Shan 
(2015) provides evidence that earnings management 
does affect the value relevance of accounting numbers. 
The study indicates that in comparing to companies 
without earnings management, the impact of earnings 
management on the value relevance of earnings in 
Chinese companies is greater. These observations may 
be due to the belief that earnings management is an 
indicator for the low reliability of earnings (Whelan & 
McNamara 2004).
The above discussion indicates that there is a strong 
justification that earnings management is related to value 
relevance of accounting information. However, the 
direction is not consistent depending on the theory used, 
i.e. signalling theory or agency theory. If informational 
earnings management is dominant, earnings management 
is expected to increase value relevance of accounting 
information. Conversely, if earnings management 
is opportunistic, the value relevance of accounting 
information is expected to be impaired. Therefore, our 
hypothesis 1 is:
H1 Earnings management affects the value relevance of 
accounting information. 
THE ROLE OF UNDERINVESTMENT IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND THE VALUE 
RELEVANCE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
Prior studies examined the role of debt level and growth 
(Gul et al. 2000), earnings surprise (Defond & Park 
2001), the announcement of equity offerings (Marquardt 
& Wiedman 2004), high growth (Gul et al. 2003), good 
corporate governance (Bugshan 2005) and free cash 
flow (Rahman & Mohd-Saleh 2008) as conditions that 
motivate managers to manage earnings. However, these 
findings are not conclusive. Gul et al. (2000) reported that 
the value relevance of earnings management increases 
in high growth firms and decreases in firms with high 
debt. This is because the high growth firms will manage 
their earnings for the purpose of providing internal 
information (informational earnings management) on 
the actual performance. However, firms with high debt 
will hide their actual performance through opportunistic 
earnings management. 
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Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) examined secondary 
equity offering as a condition to manage earnings, which 
may impair the value relevance of accounting information. 
They provided the evidence that earnings management 
reduces the value relevance of earnings for a sample in 
which managers participate in secondary equity issues. 
The study indicated that secondary equity offering 
is a condition that motivates managers to undertake 
opportunistic earnings management. This condition leads 
to a decrease in the value relevance of the net income.
The above findings indicate that the effect of earnings 
management on the value relevance of accounting 
information depends on the conditions that motivate 
managers to perform earnings management. Investors 
will lose (gain) confidence in the quality of accounting 
information if managers are motivated to undertake 
opportunistic (informative) earnings management for 
opportunistic (informational) purposes. This will lead to 
less (more) use of accounting information in decision-
making; hence, the value relevance of accounting 
information will decline (increase) and could be reflected 
in the share price of the firm. 
Underinvestment is also one of the conditions that 
can motivate managers to conduct informational earnings 
management. Underinvestment occurs when shareholders 
choose to forego a net present value investment (Mayers 
& Smith 1987) at the cost of the debt holders. The forgone 
investment is usually low risk which would provide a 
steady stream of cash flow to pay off debt holders without 
excess return to the shareholders. These firms are high 
growth opportunity firms that face liquidity constraints 
(Degryse & De Jong 2006; Morgado & Pindado 2003). 
Liquidity constraints exist when firms incur high cost 
of capital for external financing and low free cash flow. 
Therefore, these firms are motivated to disclose high 
quality accounting information to reduce their cost of 
capital (Botosan 1997; Clarkson, Guedes & Thompson 
1996). This can be done through informational earnings 
management. A recent study by Rahman et al. (2013) 
indicates that earnings management has been used for 
informative purposes in underinvestment firms. They 
believe managers of underinvestment firms may use their 
discretion to increase the quality of accounting information 
and reduce information asymmetry. This will enhance 
the value relevance of accounting information, which, 
eventually, will lead to low cost of capital. 
However, underinvestment itself can also become 
a condition for opportunistic earnings management to 
occur. Discussion in prior literature was always related 
to underinvestment with moral hazard. Suboptimal 
investments could be made by managers who are 
pursuing their personal welfares rather than maximizing 
the shareholders’ wealth (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
Such inefficiency in investment is likely to happen when 
information asymmetry occurs between firms and suppliers 
of capital (Biddle, Hilary & Verdi 2009). Therefore, the 
underinvestment condition itself is a result of information 
asymmetry. Managers wishing to pursue this strategy may 
use earnings management to conceal information and 
retain information advantage over their capital providers. 
Therefore, underinvestment may reduce value relevance 
of accounting information; i.e. underinvestment moderates 
the relationship between earnings management and share 
price/return.
Most of the above studies are conducted on developed 
countries, and limited studies examining these issues 
within the context of developing countries had been 
reported. This is especially so for a country like Malaysia 
where firms tend to rely on external financing (Driffield 
& Pal 2001), are generally financially constrained (Ismail, 
Ibrahim, Yusoff & Zainal 2010), and where financing 
is not expected to be obtained through arm’s length 
transactions, as in other Asian countries (Biddle & Hillary 
2006). Further, Abdul Rahim et al. (2010), in their study 
on the effect of firm valuation on investment expenditures 
(2002- 2007), indicated that Malaysian non-financial 
firms have shown a symptom of underinvestment. Hence, 
providing informational earnings management could 
better reflect high quality accounting information in 
these firms (Jiraporn et al. 2008).  This is because when 
earnings management is undertaken for informational 
purposes, the reported accounting information could 
actually reflect the firms’ potential expected future cash 
in-flows. Nevertheless, we also noted on the conventional 
prediction that underinvestment may reduce value 
relevance of accounting information. Therefore, our 
second hypothesis is:
H2 The relationship between earnings management and 
the value relevance of accounting information is 
moderated in underinvestment firms.  
RESEARCH METHOD
SAMPLE
The sample for this study is consisted of firms listed 
on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia between 2001 
and 2007. There are three reasons of choosing this 
duration. First, this period is more stable in explaining 
the role of underinvestment on the value relevance of 
earnings management. Further, the period is in line 
with the sample period of Abdul Rahim et al. (2010) 
which indicated a symptom of underinvestment among 
Malaysian firms. Hence, our study extended the above 
as we provided empirical evidence on the behaviour of 
these firms from the accounting and finance perspectives. 
Second, this period is also relevant since we are able to 
control future growth and firm risk that might influence 
the relationship between earnings management, value 
relevance and underinvestment. Hence, our findings are 
more reliable since the period has not been influenced 
by economic factors. Third, this period is also free 
from any regulatory effects such as convergence to 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
Malaysian firms are subjected to full compliance to the 
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IFRS effective January 2012. Therefore, excluding the 
convergence period prevents other issues such as fair 
value or comprehensive income that may influence our 
findings.  
Table 1 presents the total observations with 2,163 
firm-years having completed data. We excluded 131 firm-
year data obtained from the mining, hotel, and finance 
industries. Mining industry was excluded due to small 
number and unlikely to affect our analysis (Rahman et 
al. 2013). Meanwhile, the hotel and finance industries are 
subjected to different and additional regulations (Rahman 
& Mohd-Saleh 2008) and show different discretionary 
accrual (DACC) behaviour compared to the majority of 
firms in other industries (Peasnell, Pope & Young 2000). 
We also excluded 112 firm-years with extreme data 




We measured earnings management using DACCs that 
employs a procedure suggested by Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005). The DACC is determined through several 
steps. The procedure had also been used in the studies 
of Rahman et al. (2013), Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell and 
Goodacre (2011) and Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003). 
First, total accrual (TACC) is calculated using a cash flow 
approach, as shown in Equation (a): 
TACCit   =  EBXit  –  OCFit   (a)
Where:
TACCit = Total accrual for firm i at the end of year t
EBXit = Earnings before extraordinary items for firm I at 
the end of year t
OCFit = Operating cash flow for firm i at the end of year t
Next, we determine the non-DACC (NDACC) by 
initially estimating α1, α2, α3, and α4 using Equation (b):
TACCit / TAit–1 = α1 (1/TAit–1) + α2 (ΔREVit – ΔRECit) /TAit–1) 
+ α3 (PPEit /TAit–1) + α4 ROAit–1 + εit (b)
Where:
TAit-1 = total assets for firm i at the end of year t-1
∆REVit = the change in revenue for firm i between years 
t and t-1
∆RECit = the change in receivables for firm i between 
years t and t-1
PPEit = gross property, plant and equipment for firm i 
at the end of year t
ROAit-1 = return on assets for firm i at the end of year t-1
Other variables are as defined previously.
We then, calculate NDACC based on Equation (c), 
where we incorporate α1, α2, α3, and α4 from regression 
Equation (b). 
NDACCit = â1(1/TAit–1) + â2(ΔREVit – ΔRECit /TAit–1) + 
â3(PPEit /TAit–1) + â4ROAit–1  (c)
Where:
NDACCit = nondiscretionary accrual for firm i at the end 
of year t
Other variables are as defined previously.
Finally, we determine the DACC using Equation (d): 
DACCit = TACCit  – NDACCit  (d)
UNDERINVESTMENT
We used the dummy variable 1 to represent underinvestment 
firm (UI), and 0 otherwise. This firm should possess 
two characteristics: (1) sensitivity to internal cash flow 
with regard to investment (which reflects the liquidity 
constraint) and (2) high growth opportunity (Degryse 
& De Jong 2006; Morgado & Pindado 2003). High 
information asymmetry firms are sensitive to internal cash 
flow with regard to investment as they need to use internal 
cash flow more for investment purposes since they could 
not easily obtain external financing (Fazzari, Hubbard & 
Petersen 1988). Prior to allocating the variables, first, we 
identified the cash flow-investment sensitivity (CFIS) in 
order to separate firms into firms with and without cash 
flow-investment sensitivity. This separation is based on 
Equation (e), which was developed by Hovakimian and 
Hovakimian (2009):
 
TABLE 1. Sample of the study
 Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Initial observations 290 318 305 308 311 311 320 2,163
Less:
 Firms in finance, hotel and mining industries 17 22 13 15 19 24 21 131
 Firms which have extreme observation 13 14 18 18 14 15 20 112
Final observation 260 282 274 275 278 272 279 1,920
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CFIS =  
     
(e)
Where, CFIS is cash flow-investment sensitivity, 
n is the total observation years for firm i, t is the 
observation period, CF is cash flow and I is investment. 
The CFIS value should be higher for ﬁrms that tend to 
invest more in years with relatively high cash ﬂow and 
less in years with relatively low cash ﬂow (Biddle & 
Hilary 2006). Firms with CFIS higher (lower) than the 
average CFIS from the sample are classified as having 
(not having) CFIS. 
Second, we determined the market to book value 
ratio to measure the growth opportunity. A higher ratio 
predicts high growth opportunity for firms (Holthausen 
& Larcker 1992). Finally we categorized the firms as 
underinvestment if their values of CFIS and market to 
book value ratio are higher than the sample mean. 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL
THE VALUE RELEVANCE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
We used Ohlson’s (1995) model (Equation 1) to measure 
the value relevance of accounting information. To 
examine the value relevance of earnings (E), earnings 
management and book value (BV), we classified E into 
managed earnings (EM), which is proxied by DACC, and 
unmanaged earnings (UME) (which consists of cash 
flow from operation (CFO) and NDACC). This is shown 
in Equation 2.  We also incorporated Equation 3 to 
examine the value relevance of UME and BV. To do so, we 
examined the incremental explanatory power of earnings 
management (EM) beyond BV and UME by comparing 
the adjusted R2 for Equation 2 with the adjusted R2 for 
Equation 3. This approach had been used in Collins et 
al. (1997), Graham and King (2000), Ho, Liu and Sohn 
(2001) and Hassan, Percy and Stewart (2006).
Pit = α0+ α1 BVit + α2 Eit + εit  (1)
where:
Pit = market value of firms’ common equity measured 
three months following the financial year end for 
firm i at time t  
BVit = book value of equity for firm i at year end of time t
Eit = earnings for the year available to firm’s common 
shareholders for firm i  at time t
εit = error term
Pit = α0+ α1BVit + α2UMEit + α3EMit + εit  (2)
where:
EMit = managed earnings for the year available to firm’s 
common shareholders for firm i at time t
UMEit = unmanaged earnings for the year available to 
firm’s common shareholders for firm i at time t
The rest are as defined above.
Pit = α0+ α1BVit + α2UMEit + εit  (3)
We believed that future growth and firm risk may 
affect the above relationships. Therefore, we included 
these variables as control variables, in Equations 2 and 
3 as to determine whether our results are sensitive to the 
variables. We included size (LogSize) to represent future 
firm growth; and leverage (Lev) as a proxy for firm risk 
as it would increase the uncertainty on firm performance 
(Boot & Thakor 1993). Previous studies indicated that 
highly leveraged firms in some Asian countries have to 
pay a greater premium on external financing (Agung 
2000; Driffield & Pal 2001). This reduces funds for 
investment, which reduces the ability of the firms to raise 
external financing (Agung 2000). These relationships 
are shown below:
Pit = α0+ α1 BVit + α2 UMEit + α3 LogSizeit + α4 Levit + εit  
(4)
Pit = α0+ α1 BVit + α2 UMEit + α3 EM + α4 LogSizeit + 
α5 Levit + εit (5)
where:
LogSizeit = natural logarithm of total assets to firm’s 
common shareholders for firm i at time t 
Levit = leverage, total debt/total equity to firm’s 
common shareholders for firm i at time t 
The rest are as defined above.
To examine the roles of underinvestment (UI) in 
the value relevance of earnings management (H2), an 
interaction variable is included in Equations 2 and 5. 
The interaction variable (UI*EM) is introduced to reflect 
the underinvestment as condition for informational (or 
otherwise opportunistic) earnings management. This 
relationship is shown below.
Pit = α0+ α1 BVit + α2UMEit + α3EMit + α4UI * EMit + εit  
(6)
Pit = α0+ α1BVit + α2UME it + α3EM + α4LogSize it + 
α5 Levit + α6UI * EMit + εit (7)
where:
UIit = dummy variable 1 for underinvestment and 0 
otherwise for firm i at time t.
UI*EMit = interaction between underinvestment firm and 
earnings management for firm i at time t.
The rest are as defined above.
Bab 10.indd   104 8/25/2016   5:06:11 PM
105Underinvestment and Value Relevance of Earnings Management 
The above equations are also extended to include 
the interaction between UI and the other variables. This 
is shown in Equations 8 and 9.
Pit = α0+ α1BVit + α2UMEit + α3EMit + α4UIit + α5UI * BVit
+ α6UI * UMEit + α7UI * EMit + εit (8)
Pit = α0+ α1BVit + α2UMEit + α3EMit + α4UIit * BVit + 
α5UIit * UMEit + α6UIit * EMit + α7LogSizeit + α8Levit + εit
(9)
where:
UI*BVit = interaction between UI and BV of equity to 
firm’s common shareholders for firm i at 
time t
UI*UMEit = interaction between UI and UME to firm’s 
common shareholders for firm i at time t
UI*EMit = interaction between UI and EM to firm’s 
common shareholders for firm i at time t
The rest are as defined above.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
Table 2 presents a pool sample of the underinvestment 
and non-underinvestment firms. There are 143 firms 
categorized as UI and 1,777 firms as non-underinvestment. 
These figures indicate that the sample is not balanced 
between both forms of companies, in that UI only 
represent 7% of the sample. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Panel A of Table 3 indicates that the mean for market 
value per share is 0.8445 with a standard deviation of 
0.4642. The minimum and maximum values of market 
value per share (P) are 0.0600 and 2.5500, respectively. 
Panel A also reports the mean, standard deviation and 
minimum and maximum values of UME and BV for 
our sample.  The means, standard deviation, minimum 
value and maximum value for both variables are 0.0694 
(UME) and 1.6049 (BV), 0.2761 (UME) and 1.0082 (BV), 
-0.7910 (UME) and -1.0560 (BV) and 0.9347 (UME) and 
4.7220 (BV), respectively. The mean of EM is 0.0309, 
which indicates that firms tend to increase earnings 
through EM. The standard deviation for EM is 0.2662, 
while the minimum and maximum values are -0.8200 
and 0.8532, respectively. 
In order to examine H2, we grouped our sample 
into underinvestment (UI) and non-underinvestment 
firms. This will help us to identify whether UI affects 
the relationship between EM and the value relevance of 
accounting information. The mean of UI firm is 0.0745 
and standard deviation is 0.2626. The mean of CFIS for 
this study is 0.00713 and the mean for the market to 
book ratio is 1.1654. We also examined the descriptive 
statistics for both sample firms. Table 3 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the variables. 
When panels B and C were compared, it reveals 
that UI firms (Panel B) performed better than non-
underinvestment firms (Panel C). This can be seen from 
the log market value (P) and earnings per share. The 
mean P for UI is 1.5507, which is larger than the P of 
non-underinvestment firms (0.7876). The mean of UME 
for UI firms is higher (0.1748) than non-underinvestment 
firms (0.0610). Both groups reported a positive value 
for the mean of EM.  However, in contrast to the above, 
EM mean for UI firms is lower (0.0100) than the non-
underinvestment firms (0.0325). This indicates that non-
underinvestment firms are aggressively managing their 
earnings compared to UI firms. Meanwhile, the standard 
deviation of UME per share for non-underinvestment 
firms is lower (0.2709) than the UI firms (0.3169). This 
might be because non-underinvestment firms are more 
aggressive in smoothing their income through EM. The 
mean of BV for UI firms is lower (1.3994) than the 
mean of BV per share for non-underinvestment firms 
(1.6215).
Table 4 presents results for the Pearson correlation 
matrix. It indicates that the highest correlation is at 
-0.6511, i.e. between UME and EM. According to 
Gujarati (2003) multicollinearity is not an issue since 
the correlation is lower than 0.80.  
TABLE 2. Sample of underinvestment and non-underinvestment firms
   Year     Total
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Underinvestment firms 19 29 18 23 21 12 21 143
Non Underinvestment firms 241 253 256 252 257 260 258 1,777
Total 260 282 274 275 278 272 279 1,920
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TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Pool sample (n = 1,920)
 Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
  Deviation 
P 0.8445 0.4642 0.0600 2.5500
UME 0.0694 0.2761 -0.7910 0.9347
BV 1.6049 1.0082 -1.0560 4.7220
EM 0.0309 0.2662 -0.8200 0.8532
UI 0.0745 0.2626 0.0000 1.0000
LogSize 12.5437 1.2248 9.5800 17.2600
Lev 25.5437 22.4118 0.0000 192.4400
R 0.1060 0.6519 -0.9259 14.5000
ΔUME -0.5669 26.4259 -829.0063 546.6727
ΔEM 0.2110 61.4543 -1043.034 1785.289
Panel B: Underinvestment firms (n = 143)
P 1.5507 0.3544 0.5700 2.4100
UME 0.1748 0.3169 -0.7910 0.9347
BV 1.3994 0.8912 0.0600 4.0010
EM 0.0100 0.2862 -0.8200 0.8532
UI 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
LogSize 13.2816 1.3335 10.9900 16.0800
Lev 30.7559 23.5894 0.0000 87.9500
R 0.5693 1.9463 -0.6196 14.5000
ΔUME 0.6643 9.3399 -64.4952 39.0437
ΔEM -0.3177 19.2251 -175.6596 110.5643
Panel C: Non-underinvestment firms (n = 1,777)
P 0.7876 0.4235 0.0600 2.5500
UME 0.0610 0.2709 -0.7910 0.9347
BV 1.6215 1.0155 -1.0560 4.7220
EM 0.0325 0.2645 -0.8200 0.8532
UI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LogSize 12.2702 1.1843 9.5800 17.2600
Lev 25.1242 22.2683 0.0000 192.4400
R 0.0687 0.3710 0.9259 5.6000
ΔUME -0.6660 27.3400 -829.0063 546.6727
ΔEM 0.2535 63.6486 -1043.034 1785.289
Notes: P = market value of firms’ common equity measured three months following the financial year; UME = unmanaged earnings for year 
available to firm’s common shareholders (OCF and NDACC); BV = book value of equity for year available to  firm’s common shareholders EM 
= earnings management (DACC). UI = underinvestment firms. LogSize = Natural logarithm of total assets; Lev = Leverage, total debt divided 
by total equity. R = annual share return for firm i between the current year and last year; ΔUME = change of annual unmanaged earnings for year 
available to firm’s common shareholders; ΔEM = change of annual managed earnings for year available to firm’s common shareholders.
TABLE 4. Pearson correlation matrix
 EM ΔEM ΔUME P LEV LogSize BV UME R UI
EM  1.0000
ΔEM  0.0431   1.0000
ΔUME  0.0017  -0.0172   1.0000
P  0.0745 ***  0.0170   0.0010 1.0000
LEV -0.0374  -0.0338  -0.0262 -0.2510 ***  1.0000
LogSize  0.0437   0.0062  -0.0006  0.5830 *** -0.1375 ***  1.0000
BV  0.1397 *** -0.0072   0.0063  0.5681 *** -0.2762 ***  0.3188 ***  1.0000
UME -0.6511 *** -0.0398   0.0153  0.3537 *** -0.1592 ***  0.2346 ***  0.2317 ***  1.0000
R  0.0082  0.0462 **  0.0130  0.1833 ***  0.0492 **  0.0869 *** -0.0195   0.0329   1.0000
UI -0.0222  -0.0024   0.0132  0.4317 ***  0.0660 ***  0.2169 *** -0.0578 **  0.1083 *** 0.2017 *** 1.0000
Notes: *** Significant at p < 0.01,** significant at p < 0.05 (two tails)
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RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS
VALUE RELEVANCE OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Table 5 reports the results of H1 which examine whether 
earnings management (managed earnings) affects the 
value relevance of unmanaged earnings and book value. 
Column 3 presents the results for Equation 3, and Column 
2 presents the results for Equation 2. We examined H1 
based on the fixed effect since the p values of the Hausman 
test for both models are significant at 0.00 (Gujarati 2003). 
The chi square is 15.8139 for Equation 2 and 10.2550 for 
Equation 3.
The focus of this test is on coefficients α1, α2 and α3, 
which show the relationships between BV, UME and EM, 
and the share price of the firms.  Column 3 indicates that 
the coefficient of UME is positive and significant (0.3393, 
p < 0.01). Similar results are also found for BV (0.2381, p 
< 0.01). Our findings indicate that accounting information 
(UME and BV) is value relevant. The adjusted R2 for this 
model is 0.4388. Column 2 indicates that α2 is positive and 
significant (0.6887, p < 0.01). The coefficient of BV (α1) is 
also significant (0.1988, p < 0.01). Our results also indicate 
that α3 is positive and significant (0.4915, p < 0.01). These 
findings indicate that UME, BV and EM are value relevant. 
The adjusted R2 for the model is 0.4746.
Graham and King (2000), Ho et al. (2001) and 
Hassan et al. (2006) examined the value relevance of 
accounting information in a form of explanatory power 
of variables. They compared the adjusted R2 of the 
equation with and without certain variables. Following 
their studies, we compared the adjusted R2 of Equation 3 
with the adjusted R2 Equation 2. This procedure assesses 
whether EM is value relevant and provides incremental 
explanatory power beyond the BV and UME (Hassan et al. 
2006). Column 2 indicates that EM provides incremental 
explanatory power beyond BV and UME (Adj R2
EM/UME
) 
with incremental value 0.0358.  Based on the above, we 
therefore believed that H1 is supported, i.e. EM is value 
relevant and it affects the value relevance of accounting 
information. Our findings are consistent with the present 
of firms size (LogSize) and leverage (Lev) (Equation 4 and 
5). Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 indicate that EM provides 
incremental explanatory power beyond BV and UME (Adj 
R2
EM/UME
) with incremental value of 0.0636.
The above results indicate that EM increases the 
value relevance of accounting information. The increase 
in the adjusted R2 after EM is included in Equation 2 and 
Equation 5, which indicates that earnings management is 
used for informative purposes; and, hence, it is used by 
investors in investment decision-making. These findings 
support the signalling theory in which firms use EM 
to convey private information to market participants 
to indicate their good performance (Arya et al. 2003). 
Thus, informational EM influences the confidence level 
of investors about firm performance. As a consequence, 
the market will react positively; which is reflected by 
an increase in share price. These findings are consistent 
with Arya et al. (2003), Krishnan (2003) and Siregar 
and Utama (2008). These studies indicate that managers 
managed their earnings to convey private information in 
order to increase the quality and value relevance of the 
accounting information. Hence, our evidence refutes 
prior understanding that earnings management leads 
to negative implication, such as distorting information 
which lead to over-investment (McNichols & Stubben 
2008) or inefficiency in investment (Biddle et al. 
2009).
TABLE 5. Earnings management and the value relevance of accounting information (Fixed effect) 
Variables Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5
BV (α1) 0.1988  0.2381  0.1759  0.1547
 (42.3144) *** (25.8520) *** (22.1999) *** (17.4416) ***
UME (α2) 0.6887  0.3393  0.2486  0.4673
 (16.7254) *** (10.5049) *** (9.1607) *** (11.3471) ***
EM (α3) 0.4915  -  -  0.3346
 (12.6312) ***     (8.1708) ***
LogSize -  -  0.1561  0.1434
     (24.6466)***  (20.9793) ***
Lev -  -  -0.0014  -0.0012
     (-4.0430)***  (-3.3003) ***
F-Stat 7.1029  6.2690  531.0334  10.5959
(Prob) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Adj R2 0.4746  0.4388  0.5249  0.5885
 (B)  (A)  (C)  (D)
Adj R2
EM/UME
 0.0358  -  -  0.0636
 (B –A)      (D-C)
Hausman test 15.8139  10.2550  13.5020  17.7728
 chi square (0.0012)  (0.0059)  (0.0091)  (0.0032)
 (p value) 
 
 Notes: Figure in (  ) is standard deviation, *** Significant at p < 0.01,** significant at p < 0.05 (two tails), (n=1,920)
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UNDERINVESTMENT AND VALUE RELEVANCE OF 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Table 6 presents results for H2 concerning the role of 
underinvestment toward the value relevance of earnings 
management. Column 2 presents results for Equations 
6 which extended Equation 2. Equation 6 indicates that 
earnings management, and the other variables, i.e. UME 
and BV are value relevant. However, the value relevance 
of earnings management within the underinvestment firms 
(UI*EM) has been reduced (α4=-0.7667, p < 0.0000). 
The result is consistent even where the interactions 
between UI and BV, EM and UME (Equation 8) and 
the control variables (Equation 9) are considered. A 
negative relationship has also been reported for UME 
(α5 = -0.8677, p < 0.0000). This indicates that earnings 
management within underinvestment firms could have 
been used in an opportunistic way. These findings are 
consistent with Dechow and Skinner (2000), Whelan and 
McNamara (2004) and Habib (2004). However, a positive 
relationship is reported for the interaction between UI and 
BV (Equations 8 and 9). 
Findings from Equation 6 in Table 6 versus Equation 
2 in Table 5 as well as from Equation 8 in Table 6 
versus Equation 4 in Table 5 are consistent in that all 
EMs are positive and significantly associated with 
firms’ market values (P). However, the negative 
coefficient for only UI*EM suggests that in our sample, 
among the underinvestment firms, there is a tendency 
among the investors to actually perceive that managers 
provide opportunistic earnings management rather than 
informative earnings management. In terms of H2, we 
believed our findings do support H2 in that the value 
relevance of EM is moderated among underinvestment 
firms in our sample. 
We further believed that the structure of the 
underinvestment and non-underinvestment firms might 
be different. Therefore, we re-estimated Equation 2 to 
Equation 5 (Table 5) for both sample firms. These analyses 
are reported in Table 7; Panel A for underinvestment firms 
and Panel B for non-underinvestment firms. Column 3 
Panel A indicates that the coefficient of UME is positive 
and significant (a2 = 0.3830, p < 0.01). Similar results are 
also found for BV (a1 = 0.1586, p < 0.01). Our findings 
indicate that accounting information (UME and BV) is 
value relevant among underinvestment firms. The adjusted 
R2 for Equation 3 is 0.4512.
Column 2 Panel A indicates that the coefficient of 
UME (α2) is positive and significant (α2 = 0.3236, p <0.01). 
The coefficient of BV is also significant (α1 = 0.1358, p 
<0.01). Our results also indicate that the coefficient of 
EM is positive and significant (α3 = 0.2644, p < 0.01). 
These findings indicate that UME, BV and EM are value 
relevant among underinvestment firms. The adjusted R2 
for Equation 2 is 0.4784.
TABLE 6. Underinvestment and the value relevance of earnings management, unmanaged earnings and
book value (Fixed effect) 
Variables Equation 6 Equation 7 Equation 8 Equation 9
BV 0.1902  0.1525  0.1910  0.1586
 (19.7757) *** (17.1614) *** (21.8162) *** (19.6164) ***
UME 0.8344  0.5357  0.7779  0.4470
 (16.4842) *** (11.2100) *** (15.2704) *** (9.1214) ***
EM 0.6589  0.4106  0.6248  0.3470
 (12.4618) *** (8.3741) *** (12.2412) *** (7.1950) ***
LogSize -  0.1402  -  0.1225
   (20.2511) ***   (19.1798) ***
Lev -  -0.0011  -  -0.0017
   (-2.9405) ***   (-5.0512) ***
UI*BV -  -  0.4637  0.3808
     (18.6748) *** (16.7362) ***
UI*UME -  -  -0.8677  -0.4396
     (-6.9403) *** (-3.8442) ***
UI*EM -0.7667  -0.3267  -0.9277  -0.5374
 (-6.0069) *** (-2.8044) *** (-7.9992) *** (-5.0627) ***
F-Stat 7.3564  10.6307  10.4547  14.2355
(Prob) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Adj R2 0.4856  0.59022  0.5858  0.6659
Hausman test 15.3642  19.3373  18.3275  19.3765
chi square  (0.0040) *** (0.0036) *** (0.0055) *** (0.0130) **
(p value) 
 
Notes: Figure in (  ) is standard deviation. *** and ** Significant at p < 0.01 and at p < 0.05 (two tails) respectively. UI = underinvestment firm, 
which represented by a dummy variable 1 for underinvestment and 0 otherwise. UI*BV = interaction between underinvestment firm and book 
value of equity; UI*UME = interaction between underinvestment firm and unmanaged earnings; UI*EM = interaction between underinvestment 
firm and managed earnings. Other variables are as define in Table 5.
(n = 1,920)
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Table 7 Panel B reports the results for non-
underinvestment firms. We examined H2 for non-
underinvestment firms based on the fixed effect. The chi 
squares for Equations 2 to 5 are between 10.1067 and 
17.9333. Column 3 Panel B reports that the UME and 
BV are value relevant among our non-underinvestment 
firms. The coefficients for UME and BV are 0.2580 and 
0.2671, respectively. Both are significant at p = 0.01. The 
adjusted R2 for this model (Equation 3) is 0.5304. Column 
2 Panel B indicates that the coefficient of UME (α2) is 
0.7480 and significant at p < 0.01. The coefficient of 
BV (α1) is 0.2231 and significant at p < 0.01. Our results 
also indicate that the coefficient of EM is significant 
(α3 = 0.5956, p < 0.01). These findings indicate that 
UME, BV and EM are value relevant among our non-
underinvestment firms. The adjusted R2 for Equation 2 
is 0.5743. Column 2 Panel B indicates that EM provides 
incremental explanatory power beyond BV and UME 
with an incremental value of 0.0439 among our non-
underinvestment firms.  
H2 examines the role of underinvestment on the 
value relevance of earnings management and other 
accounting information (i.e. unmanaged earnings 
and book value). To assess this, we compared the Adj 
TABLE 7. Underinvestment and the value relevance of earnings management, unmanaged earnings and book value
Variables Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 
Panel A: Underinvestment (n = 143) (Random Effect)
BV 0.1358  0.1589  0.1586  0.1358
 (4.0790) *** (4.7121) *** (4.6442) *** (4.0391) ***
UME 0.3236  0.3393  0.3830  0.3215
 (3.4745) *** (4.0489) *** (3.9933) *** (3.4210) ***
EM 0.2544  -  -  0.2560
 (2.9266) ***     (2.9195) ***
LogSize -  -  -0.0079  -0.0079
     (-0.4639)  (-0.4785)
Lev -  -  -0.0004  -0.0004
     (-0.3633) *** (-0.4813)
F-Stat 44.4200  59.3812  29.4397  26.4106
(Prob) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Adj R2 0.4784  0.4512  0.4448  0.4722
 (B)  (A)  (C)  (D)
Adj R2
EM/UME
 0.0272  -  -  0.0274
 (B –A)      (D-C)
Hausman test 1.2478  0.3666  1.2683  2.6234
chi square (0.7416)  (0.8325)  (0.8667)  (0.7578)
(p value)
Variables Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 
Panel B: Non-underinvestment (n = 1,777) (Fixed Effect) 
BV 0.2231  0.2671  0.2002  0.1845
 (26.5927) *** (33.4355) *** (26.4163) *** (23.6705) ***
UME 0.7480  0.2580  0.1451  0.4176
 (15.6501) *** (9.0462) *** (5.7702) *** (9.0387) ***
EM 0.5956  -  -  0.3165
 (12.4576) ***     (6.9852) ***
LogSize -  -  0.1327  0.1205
     (21.1395) *** (18.7725) ***
Lev -  -  -0.0023  -0.0018
     (-6.9180) *** (-5.5086) ***
F-Stat 9.4661  8.1121  12.6010  13.1302
(Prob) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Adj R2 0.5743  0.5304  0.6498  0.6606
 (B)  (A)  (C)  (D)
Adj R2
EM/UME
 0.0439  -  -  0.0108
 (B –A)      (D-C)
Hausman test 14.9085  10.1067  12.9647  17.9331
chi square (0.0019)  (0.0064)  (0.0114)  (0.0030)
(p value) 
 
Notes: Figure in (  ) is standard deviation. *** Significant at p < 0.01 (two tails)
All variables are as defined in previous tables.
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R2
EM/UME
 for underinvestment firms (Table 7 Panel A) 
with the Adj R2
EM/UME
 for non-underinvestment firms 
(Table 7 Panel B). Our results indicate that the Adj R2
EM/
UME
 for non-underinvestment firms (0.0439) exceeds the 
Adj R2
EM/UME
 for underinvestment firms (0.0272). The 
positive relationship between EM and firms’ market 
values in underinvestment firms is weaker compared to 
non-underinvestment firms (t-statistic of EM in Panel A 
for underinvestment firms is at 2.9266 versus t-statistic 
of EM in Panel B for non-underinvestment firms is at 
12.4576). Thus, we believed that H2 is supported in that 
underinvestment firms moderate the value relevance 
of EM. This finding is consistent with our finding in 
Table 6 for Equations 6 to 9 with regard to the negative 
coefficient of variable UI*EM.
The above findings do not support our expectation 
that underinvestment firms provide high quality 
accounting information. We expect high quality 
disclosure to increase the liquidity and demand for 
shares (Diamond & Verrecchia 1991), reduce the cost of 
capital (Clarkson et al. 1996; Botosan 1997), and reduce 
information asymmetry (Kim & Verrechia 1994; Brown, 
Stephen & Lo 2004). We expect underinvestment firms 
to be motivated to provide high quality information 
through informational earnings management in order to 
reduce information asymmetry and liquidity constraints. 
However, our finding indicates that underinvestment has 
become a condition perceived by investors for managers 
to undertake opportunistic earnings management among 
Malaysian firms. Managers are perceived by investors 
to pursue their personal welfares rather than maximising 
shareholders’ wealth (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
As the main objective of this study is to examine the 
value relevance of earnings management and prior studies 
argued on the drawbacks of the price model (Chen, Chen 
& Su 2001), hence the returns model was also adopted. 
This, hopefully, will overcome the scale effects in 
the price model (Lin & Chen 2005). We expected the 
utilization of the returns model would support our 
findings from the price model based on Ohlson (1995). 
We also expected our findings to be consistent with Chen 
et al. (2001) and Lin and Chen (2005). The return model 
used in this study is as follow.
Rit = α0+ α1UMEit + α2ΔUMEit + α3EMit + α4ΔEMit + εit
   (10)
While the returns model incorporating the interaction 
effect is as follows:
Rit = α0+ α1UME it + α2ΔUME it + α3EM it + α4ΔEM it 
+ α 5UI i t*UME i t  + α 6UI i t *EM i t  + α 7UI i t *ΔUME i t 
+ α8UI it *ΔEM it + ε it
   
(11)
Where:
Rit  = annual share return for firm i between the 
current year and prior year
ΔUMEit = change of annual unmanaged earnings 
for the year available to firm’s common 
shareholders for firm i at time t
ΔEMit = change of annual managed earnings 
for year available to firm’s common 
shareholders for firm i at time t
UIit*ΔUMEit = interaction between underinvestment 
firm and change in unmanaged earnings 
for the year available to firm’s common 
shareholders.
UIit*ΔEMit = interaction between underinvestment 
firm and change in managed earnings 
for the year available to firm’s common 
shareholders.
Other variables are as defined in other tables.
Our analyses indicate that UME (0.2422) and EM 
(0.2804) for Equation 10 are positively related to change 
in market value at p < 0.01. These findings are consistently 
significant after the interaction between underinvestment 
and the four earnings components were examined 
(Equation 11). However, both ΔEM and ΔUME are not 
significantly associated with share returns.  Our finding 
also indicates that underinvestment reduces the value 
relevance of EM. The coefficient for the UI*EM is -0.3287 
and significant at p < 0.05 with change in market value. 
This finding is consistent with findings based on the Ohlson 
model. This indicates that EM is not informative among 
underinvestment firms. Finding suggests that investors 
perceived managers to convey opportunistic earnings 
management among underinvestment firms in Malaysia.
In addition to the above analysis, we believed that 
capital intensity or type of industry might affect our main 
findings for hypothesis 2 (Equations, 2, 3, 4 and 5). This 
is because profitability, growth and capital intensity are 
important drivers of free cash flow and the value of the 
firm (Miller & Mathisen 2004). Capital intensity can 
be associated with type of industry such as airlines, oil 
production and refining, telecommunication, mining 
and chemical plants as these firms use a large portion of 
their capitals to buy fixed assets. In order to perform this 
analysis, we included a dummy variable to represent 
seven categories of industry of our sample. These 
industries are of industrial product which represents 
27.66% of our sample, trade services (22.92%), property 
(15.36%), consumer product (13.49%), construction 
(8.91%), plantation (7.08%) and technology (4.58%). In 
view that the number of firms in technological industry 
is small and to avoid bias in our findings, we included 
a dummy variable one (1) to represent one industry and 
zero (0) otherwise. However, industrial product and 
plantation are excluded from the analyses; whereby the 
former industry represents the highest number of firm 
in the sample, while for the latter we found that there is 
no plantation firm being classified as underinvestment 
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firms. Therefore, in total, our industry dummy variable 
to re-estimate Equations 4 and 5 is five (5). 
Our other results provide consistent findings as 
reported in Table 7. We found that BV, UME and EM 
remain significant for both underinvestment and non-
underinvestment categories. BV and UME are significant 
at p < 0.01 for Equations 2 and 3 for both underinvestment 
and non-underinvestment categories. Our analyses 
also indicate that earnings management is significant 
at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 for underinvestment and non-
underinvestment, respectively. Consistent with the main 
analysis, the additional analysis, which incorporates five 
dummy variables for category of industry, indicates that 
the Adj R2 
EM/UME
 for non-underinvestment (0.0536) still 
exceeded the Adj R2
EM/UME
 for underinvestment firms 
(0.0221). The positive relationship between EM and firms’ 
market values in underinvestment firms remained weaker 
(t-statistics 2.5605) compared to non-underinvestment 
firms. The results are consistent even after we included 
LogSize and Lev in Equations 4 and 5.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to test the relationship between 
earnings management and firm share price (value relevance 
of earnings management), and the role of underinvestment 
on the relationship between earnings management and share 
price. In the present study, we contribute to the literature in 
accounting (earnings management and value relevant), as 
well as finance (underinvestment) by providing additional 
conditions for the possibility of informational or non-
informational earnings management to occur within the 
Malaysian context. Our condition specifically involved 
investigation of whether the relationship is moderated by 
an underinvestment problem. 
Our results indicate that unmanaged earnings, book 
value and earnings management are value relevant 
to our sample firms. Our study also indicates that 
earnings management provides incremental value 
beyond unmanaged earnings and book value. Our results 
generally support the informational perspective that 
earnings management contributes to the value relevance 
of accounting information. However, our results indicate 
that underinvestment moderates the relationship between 
earnings management and the value relevance of 
accounting information. The positive relationship between 
EM and the value relevance of accounting information is 
weaker among underinvestment firms. Thus, we suggest 
that underinvestment can reduce the value relevance 
of accounting information (EM, UME and BV). These 
findings are unique and can be catalysts for future research 
in investigating other conditions that motivate managers 
to perform informational earnings management. This can 
provide new knowledge on earnings management from the 
informative perspective, which differs from the current 
practice that investigates earnings management from the 
opportunistic perspective only.
The findings from this study may be relevant to 
the policy makers, practitioners and researchers. Our 
study indicates that in general, earnings management is 
informative, in that it increases the value relevance of 
accounting information. This indicates that regulators and 
standard setters, while developing or proposing accounting 
standards, should allow managers to use their discretion 
to convey internal information for better decisions. 
This holds true, particularly for underinvestment firms, 
which may use earnings management to convey internal 
information (high quality accounting information) and 
reduce information asymmetry and cost of capital. Hence, 
this would attract external investors to finance their 
profitable projects. However, our analysis results suggest 
that in Malaysia, investors do not generally perceived 
earnings management among underinvestment firms as 
pure informative information. As such our study indicates 
that underinvestment could be one of the conditions that 
motivates managers to perform informational earnings 
management to some extent. We believed that these 
findings contribute to the limited studies that examine 
the role of underinvestment in motivating managers to 
perform informational earnings management. However, 
informational perspective is not conclusive because 
investors do not always perceived earnings management 
among underinvestment firms to be informative.
We acknowledged that this study is subjected to 
several limitations. Firms that are excluded from the 
sample might influence our results and might raise 
questions of internal validity. In addition, the sophistication 
and capital market efficiency in Malaysia is different from 
other countries. The generalization of our findings to 
other countries should be undertaken with caution due to 
diversity in accounting standards and regulations. Even 
though underinvestment firms tend to reduce information 
asymmetry through earnings management to some extent, 
their objective in decreasing the cost of capital is still 
unknown. Sample period might limit our generalisation 
to the different economics environment. Therefore, future 
research might consider multiple economics condition 
such as global economics crisis and convergence to the 
IFRS period. Future research may investigate whether 
earnings management by underinvestment firms reduces 
the cost of capital. Future research might also want to 
examine the effect of earnings management on the future 
profitability of underinvestment firms. 
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